Amusement Hypothesis.


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Category: Sports / Games
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Prisoner\'s Dilemma. Amid the Stalinist EraRussian Conductor contemplating Tchaikovsky score on the train to MinskArrested by the KGBThrown into prisonFor three days, he is told nothing
Transcripts
Slide 1

Amusement Theory The investigation of reasonable conduct among related specialists Agents have a typical enthusiasm to make the pie as extensive as would be prudent, yet Agents have contending premiums to boost their own offer of the pie. An operator\'s normal choices require envisioning adversaries\' reactions These desires are not immaculate, so instability is an essential component of amusements

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Prisoner\'s Dilemma During the Stalinist Era Russian Conductor considering Tchaikovsky score on the train to Minsk Arrested by the KGB Thrown into jail For three days, he is told nothing … .Then… …

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Prisoner\'s Dilemma "We have your companion Tchaikovsky and he is beginning to talk" Should the conductor admit?

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Prisoner\'s Dilemma Tchaikovsky Confess Don\'t Confess Conductor ( - 8, - 8) ( 0, - 15) Confess ( - 15, 0) Don\'t Confess ( - 1, - 1)

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Prisoner\'s Dilemma Tchaikovsky Confess Don\'t Confess Conductor ( - 8 , - 8) ( 0, - 15) Confess ( - 15 , 0) Don\'t Confess ( - 1, - 1)

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Prisoner\'s Dilemma Tchaikovsky Confess Don\'t Confess Conductor ( - 8, - 8) ( 0 , - 15) Confess ( - 15, 0) Don\'t Confess ( - 1 , - 1)

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Prisoner\'s Dilemma Conclusion: The Conductor will admit And Tchaikovsky?

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Prisoner\'s Dilemma Tchaikovsky Confess Don\'t Confess Conductor ( - 8, - 8 ) ( 0, - 15 ) Confess ( - 15, 0) Don\'t Confess ( - 1, - 1)

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Prisoner\'s Dilemma Tchaikovsky Confess Don\'t Confess Conductor ( - 8, - 8 ) ( 0, - 15) Confess ( - 15, 0) Don\'t Confess ( - 1, - 1)

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Prisoner\'s Dilemma Conclusion: Tchaikovsky admits likewise Both get 8 years, despite the fact that on the off chance that they participated, they could get off with one year each For both, admission is an overwhelming system: a procedure that yields a superior result paying little heed to the rival\'s decision

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Prisoner\'s Dilemma What might the Conductor and Tchaikovsky choose in the event that they could arrange? They could both turn out to be in an ideal situation in the event that they achieved the agreeable arrangement… . which is the reason police cross examine suspects in discrete rooms. Harmony need not be productive. Noncooperative balance in the Prisoner\'s quandary brings about an answer that is not the most ideal result for the gatherings.

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Equilibrium Nash Equilibrium: Neither player has a motivator to change technique, given the other player\'s decision Both admit is a Nash Equilibrium Both don\'t admit is not a Nash Equilibrium, adversary will dependably need to renege

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Dominant Firm Game Two firms, one substantial and one little Either firm can declare a yield level (lead) or else hold up to see what the opponent does and after that deliver a sum that does not immerse the business sector.

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Dominant Firm Game Dominant Lead Follow Subordinate ( 0.5, 4) ( 3, 2) Lead ( 1, 8) Follow ( 0.5, 1)

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Dominant Firm Game Dominant Lead Follow Subordinate ( 0.5, 4 ) ( 3, 2 ) Lead ( 1, 8) Follow ( 0.5, 1)

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Dominant Firm Game Dominant Lead Follow Subordinate ( 0.5, 4) ( 3, 2) Lead ( 1, 8 ) Follow ( 0.5, 1 )

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Dominant Firm Game Conclusion: Dominant Firm will dependably lead… .. In any case, shouldn\'t something be said about the Subordinate firm?

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Dominant Firm Game Dominant Lead Follow Subordinate ( 0.5, 4) ( 3 , 2) Lead ( 1, 8) Follow ( 0.5 , 1)

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Dominant Firm Game Dominant Lead Follow Subordinate ( 0.5 , 4) ( 3, 2) Lead ( 1 , 8) Follow ( 0.5, 1)

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Dominant Firm Game Conclusion: No overwhelming technique for the Subordinate firm. Does this mean we can\'t anticipate what they will do?

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Dominant Firm Game Dominant Lead Follow Subordinate ( 0.5, 4) ( 3, 2) Lead ( 1 , 8 ) Follow ( 0.5, 1)

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Dominant Firm Game Conclusion: Subordinate firm will dependably take after, in light of the fact that prevailing firm will dependably lead.

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Equilibrium Nash Equilibrium: Neither player has an impetus to change methodology, given the other player\'s decision Dominant: Lead & Subordinate Follow is a Nash Equilibrium A player\'s best choice might be directed by foreseeing the opponent\'s best alternative

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Timing and Ending Two Stage Game amongst An and B who are separating $1.00 Player A moves first and proposes how to part the dollar. Player B either acknowledges the split in which case the amusement finishes, or we move to cycle 2. The pie drops to $.90. Player B proposes a split. Player An acknowledges or the diversion closes and both get 0.

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Timing and Ending What ought to A do?

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Timing and Ending The planning of the end of the amusement can manage the system utilized. In the event that the amusement went past cycle 2, A\'s system would change.

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Go back to Prisoner\'s Dilemma: Is there an approach to create the helpful arrangement? Tchaikovsky Confess Don\'t Confess Conductor ( - 8, - 8) ( 0, - 15) Confess ( - 15, 0) Don\'t Confess ( - 1, - 1)

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Go back to Prisoner\'s Dilemma: Is there an approach to create the agreeable arrangement? Not a Nash Equilibrium If Conductor carries out to "Don\'t Confess", Tchaikovsky has an impetus to admit If Tchaikovsky perpetrates to "Don\'t Confess", Conductor has a motivator to admit Role of an agreement—to carry out gatherings to activities they would not embrace deliberately Alternative: Implied contract if there were an involved acquaintance between the gatherings—(accomplices in wrongdoing) will probably back each other

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Application to Collective Bargaining Two operator diversion Uncertainty Each gathering needs to foresee what the other will do Time limit matters Ability to contract influences result A long, proceeding with relationship can upgrade the proficiency of the result

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Complicating the amusement Suppose there is a scope of results Wage W M : Firm greatest pay W m : Union the lowest pay permitted by law Union W M Contract Zone W m Firm

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Where we wind up in the agreement zone relies on upon bartering power Bargaining power relies on upon Alternative open doors if no deal is come to (outside choice) Union: elective business Firm: Substitute for union specialists Relative expense of postponement Union: Strike support Firm: Inventory, quality of offers interest Commitment system Extent to which you can make the other party trust you won\'t move

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Example of a more confused Bargaining Simulation Two groups: Union(U); Management (M) Each group gets a suit of 13 cards The cards compare to wage edges: Wage M U 15 2 14 3-4 13 5-7 12 8-10 11 J-K A 10 A J-K 9 8-10 8 5-7 7 3-4 6 2 Each group draws one card that will set their reservation wage. This must not be appeared to the next group with the exception of the full data amusement. Through the rest of the rounds, groups will uncover extra cards indiscriminately Teams can uncover different cards on the off chance that they wish Teams can make explanations about their dealing destinations to the next group

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Bargaining Techniques Distributive Bargaining: View bartering as a zero entirety amusement — split of the pie: what one gathering picks up, alternate loses Example—our diversion Often joined by weight strategies Threats Bluffs Bullying/

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Bargaining Techniques Interest-Based Bargaining Attempt to touch base at effective result No applicable data advantaged Focus on tackling common issue of making the firm as fruitful as could reasonably be expected Requires long-standing haggling relationship between gatherings

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Bargaining Techniques Principled Negotiations Both sides begin with impression of the financial atmosphere and their objectives Alternative instruments to achieve these objectives are displayed Options are assessed against some target criteria or by an outsider master No private data

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Bargaining Techniques Collective Bargaining by Objectives Each gathering records its goals Objectives are organized Areas of understanding are distinguished, while the rest of the territories of contradiction are positioned by their significance to the gatherings Parties can withhold data

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Bargaining Techniques Note the likeness between these methods and the recreations Role of data Role of history Role of the other party\'s goals, activities Role of helpful versus aggressive bartering environment

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