Cuban Missile Crisis .

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Cuban Missile Crisis. Andrew Wood and Dave Ryan. A Brief Chronology. May, 1962: Khrushchev makes veiled references to a plot (How would the U.S. feel to have missiles pointing at them, as they have missiles pointed at us?)
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Cuban Missile Crisis Andrew Wood and Dave Ryan

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A Brief Chronology May, 1962: Khrushchev makes hidden references to a plot (How might the U.S. feel to have rockets indicating at them, as they have rockets pointed at us?) September: JFK and Congress issue notices USSR that US will bargain brutally with any dangers to national security October 14: U2 recon. flight over Cuba spots destinations introducing atomic rockets October 15: Presence of rockets is affirmed

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The Missiles: One Site

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Chronology, Continued October 16: President Kennedy informed October 16-22: Secret consultations on what ought to be done October 22: Kennedy tells country his arrangement for bar and isolate October 23: OAS supports maritime isolate October 24: Naval isolate starts and effectively changes course of numerous Soviet boats

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Chronology, Continued October 25: One Soviet ship challenges maritime isolate; Kennedy gives it a chance to pass October 25: At the UN, Adlai Stevenson specifically challenges the Soviet minister to admit to the presence of rockets, when the diplomat can\'t, Stevenson wheels out photos of the rocket locales October 26: Soviets raise probability for an arrangement: on the off chance that we pull back rockets will America guarantee not to attack Cuba?

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Chronology, Continued October 27: Soviets request that Americans likewise pull back rockets from Turkey; Major Anderson\'s plane is absent over Cuba, apparently shot down; U.S. recon plane strays over Soviet airspace… high strains Kennedy tells Khrushchev that he will acknowledge the proposition of the 26 th , Kennedy advises his sibling to tell the Soviet Ambassador that however the Turkey rockets would not be a piece of the deal, they would be expelled in time October 28: USSR consents to pull back rockets

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Soviet Decisions Motivations Close the rocket crevice—Currently a long ways behind U.S. as far as number of rockets Verbal dangers no more drawn out viable with overpowering confirmation of U.S. predominance Protect Cuba Reciprocity: The U.S. has rockets indicating at us, how about we perceive how they feel now

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Soviet Decisions, Continued Inability utilize the rockets If terminated a rocket, repercussions would be extreme

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Why Khrushchev Settled Effectiveness of maritime isolate Conventional mediocrity in the Caribbean No conceivable countermove Overwhelming world support for the U.S. Other conceivable reasons Got what he needed? No U.S. intrusion of Cuba U.S. rockets pulled back from Turkey

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The American Decision In September Kennedy had expressed and Congress had passed a determination saying that if the Soviet Union put hostile weapons in Cuba we would not endure it. Might we be able to then depend exclusively on tact? Kennedys thought John could be "impugned" on the off chance that he didn\'t act as per his earlier notices Determined in initial 48 hours of emergency that the expulsion of rockets was the essential target This goal viably discounted segregated tact, and left two choices…

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The American Decision cont. Choice 1 - Air Strike On October 17 th , President Kennedy "put forth the level expression that there would be an air strike, at any rate against the rocket destinations, and maybe against more extensive targets" (Bundy 394) Reservations from others, airstrike might utilize a "heavy hammer" to kill a "fly Later that day Robert McNamara recommends approach in the middle of tact and an air strike

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The American Decision cont. Alternative 2 – Blockade Advocated at an early stage by McNamara and Robert Kennedy, barricade would not require moment killing, but rather commentators dreaded it would not evacuate the rockets and would permit Soviets time to finish what they as of now had in Cuba Douglas Dillon reinforced bar contention by proposing that it would just be an initial step, that if Khrushchev did not expel the rockets to lift it, then more should be possible By Friday the 19 th , the board of trustees taking a shot at the bar adjusted it into an isolate, on Sunday Kennedy acknowledged their arrangement as the strategy

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Could America have acted in an unexpected way? Might we be able to have utilized the emergency to expel Castro? Our notices the sum total of what along had been against hostile weapons so once that notice is tried on the off chance that we utilize it to assault Castro would we say we are adhering to our assertion? Would we be able to have attempted tact before falling back on the isolate? On the off chance that we didn\'t keep mystery, Khrushchev could have announced disobedience, or reproved isolate… then both nations would be in positions where they\'re setting out straight toward each other and can\'t simply turn back

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Castro\'s Role No genuine part in basic leadership Apparently distant from the circumstance Oct. 26: "Animosity unavoidable/radicals slighting world conclusion"— Clearly not the case Khrushchev plays along to some degree yet it is clear he can\'t help contradicting him ("your recommendation would have begun an atomic world war")

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Questions Do you feel Major Anderson\'s demise supported more forceful activity? Seeing as how our alternatives in the emergency were fairly directed by the notices we issued in September… would it be advisable for us to have issued those notices? Robert Kennedy compared an air strike to Pearl Harbor (Bundy 394), was that a reasonable relationship? In the event that the rockets in Cuba were traditional, and neither the Soviet Union nor the U.S. had any atomic weapons, would the emergency have been dodged?

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The Cuban Missile Crisis

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