Normal: 80.3.

Uploaded on:
The Liberal Vision: International Politics as Tragedy. All Countries Lose From War. ... US: Pursue Objectives Through Inspections Regime OR Use Force to Overthrow Regime ...
Slide 1

Normal: 80.3

Slide 3

The Prisoners\' Dilemma and the Liberal Tragedy Lecture 9

Slide 4

The Liberal Vision: International Politics as Tragedy All Countries Lose From War. Thusly, All Countries Would Gain If All Would Prepare Less for and Engage in Fewer Wars. Disaster : Even Peace-adoring Countries Are Forced to Militarize by the Anarchic Structure of the International System.

Slide 5

The Prisoners\' Dilemma The Liberal Tragedy Arises From Strategic Interaction . The Prisoners\' Dilemma Is the Game We Will Use to Model this Interaction. The Prisoners\' Dilemma is a General Model of Cooperation. Between Individuals Between Governments

Slide 6

The Elements of a Game The Actors: Who Is Playing? On-screen characters\' Strategies: What Choices Do The Actors Have? Results: What Are the Results of the Interactive Choices Actors Make? Inclination Orders: How Do the Actors Rank All of the Possible Outcomes? The Solution: How will Each Actor Play the Game, Given the Strategies, Outcomes, and Preference Orders?

Slide 7

The India-Pakistan Nuclear Game The Actors: Pakistan and India The Strategies: Two Choices Build Nuclear Weapons Don\'t Build Nuclear Weapons The 4 Possible Outcomes: Arms Race : Both Build Nuclear Weapons Stable Military Balance : Neither Builds N. Weapons Pakistan Advantage : Pakistan Builds, India Doesn\'t India Advantage : India Builds, Pakistan Doesn\'t For Preference Orders… .

Slide 8

The Prisoners\' Dilemma

Slide 9

The India-Pakistan Game, Again

Slide 10

Solving the Game: Backwards Induction 2,2 (Arms Race) manufacture Pakistan construct don\'t fabricate 4,1 (India Advantage) India 1,4 (Pakistan Advantage) assemble don\'t construct Pakistan don\'t fabricate 3,3 (Stable Balance)

Slide 11

The Prisoners\' Dilemma, Again Dominant Strategy Pareto Optimal India Pakistan Dominant Strategy Nash Equilibrium

Slide 12

Other Examples of the Logic of the Prisoners\' Dilemma Current Struggle Between Israelis and Palestinians. Systems : Retaliate; Turn the Other Cheek France and Germany Following WWI. Systems : Re-Arm; Don\'t Re-Arm United States and Iraq Strategies : US: Pursue Objectives Through Inspections Regime OR Use Force to Overthrow Regime IRAQ: Allow Inspections in Compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions OR Refuse to Cooperate Military Force is a "Judicious" Strategy for Both Parties In All of These Conflicts.

Slide 13

Broader Importance of the Prisoners\' Dilemma Tragedy of International Politics: Both Can Be Better Off, yet Unable to Realize These Joint Gains. Failure to Realize Joint Gains Arises From Inability to Make Binding Commitments . In the event that Agreements Could Be Concluded and Enforced, Then Joint Gains Could Be Realized . The Absence of an Enforcement Mechanism — Anarchy — Is the Source of Tragedy. Change the Institutional Framework, Change International Politics.

Slide 14

Iterated Play Repeated Play of the Game Without a Known End Point. One good turn deserves another Strategies Decentralized Enforcement Mechanism. Adjusts Calculation of Payoffs Single Play: One Time Payoff Repeated Play: Stream of Payoffs Over Time Stream of Payoffs > One Time Payoff Becomes Rational To Play a Cooperative Strategy International Organizations Help Promote Transformation. Give Rule-Based Structure to Interaction. Straightforwardness Provide High Quality and Potentially Unbiased Information About Behavior of Others. De-Politicize Monitoring Help Ensure that Retaliation/Enforcement is Proportional. Avoid Vicious Cycles Is There a Way to Escape The Dilemma?

View more...