OMSAP Presentation April 2004 Force Blackout Occasions.


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Magazine Beach, upstream of Cottage Farm. 70. 110. 04/12/04. 11:46. 006. BU Bridge, downstream ... Stony Brook outlet. 3700. 2800. Restorative Actions. MWRA held two ...
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OMSAP Presentation April 2004 Power Outage Events David F. Duest Massachusetts Water Resources Authority Deer Island Treatment Plant Sept 2004

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Agenda Introduction DITP Power blackout occasions – What happened? - April 3, 2004 - April 11, 2004 Impacts Corrective Actions

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Deer Island Wastewater Treatment Plant $3.8 Billion Construction Project 2 nd Largest in US Treatment Capacity: Maximum 1.27 Billion Gal/Day joined sewer framework 810 MGD by Secondary Average Daily Flow: 360 Million Gal/Day Built on 200 Acres incorporates 60 section of land community region Removes 250 TPD of solids with 93 TPD for helpful reuse Consumes 18.5 MW day by day with Peaks to 40 MW

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NStar Building On Deer Island NStar (South Boston) K-Street Substation 115,000 Volts Cross-Harbor Cable Main Breaker 13,800 Volts Main Breaker MSB A-Bus B-Bus CTG A CTG B STG Deer Island Power Distribution Thermal Power Plant Support Facilities North Pumping South Pumping Primary Treatment A & B Primary Treatment C & D Secondary A & B Secondary C Cryogenic Oxygen Facility Residuals Treatment

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Deer Island Thermal Power Plant including NStar Building, Main Switchgear Building, NMPS & WT Headworks

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What Happened – April 2004 Event 1: April 3, 2004 07:54 (Saturday) NStar shortcoming causes loss of "B-Bus" Most huge DITP impact: loss of North Pumping (NMPS) for around 2 hours 20 minutes Event 2: April 11, 2004 19:23 (Easter Sunday) NStar line-to-line deficiency at K-Street Substation causes complete force misfortune Most noteworthy DITP impacts: - loss of all frameworks on DITP for roughly 2 hours 50 minutes

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Event 1: April 3, 2004 07:54 Event – NStar flaw causes loss of "B-Bus" Leak in rooftop at NStar building brought about the B-Bus electrical switch to trek open. DITP Effect – lost half of most frameworks on DITP Partial effects on Pumping, Primary & Secondary No effects to purification/dechlorination Lost 100% of pumping operations at NMPS

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April 3 Power Outage NStar Building On Deer Island NStar (South Boston) K-Street Substation 115,000 Volts Main Breaker 13,800 Volts Main Breaker MSB A-Bus B-Bus CTG A CTG B STG Deer Island Power Distribution Thermal Power Plant Support Facilities North Pumping South Pumping Primary Treatment A & B Primary Treatment C & D Secondary A & B Secondary C Cryogenic Oxygen Facility Residuals Treatment

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April 3 Power Outage NStar Building On Deer Island NStar (South Boston) K-Street Substation 115,000 Volts Main Breaker 13,800 Volts Main Breaker MSB A-Bus B-Bus Correction Action - Cross-tie A-Bus into B-Bus - Power reestablished to B-Bus inside minutes CTG A CTG B STG Deer Island Power Distribution Thermal Power Plant Support Facilities North Pumping South Pumping Primary Treatment A & B Primary Treatment C & D Secondary A & B Secondary C Cryogenic Oxygen Facility Residuals Treatment

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Event 1: April 3, 2004 07:54 B-Bus breakers reset at all pump stations Pumps re-began at South System Pump Station, NMPS & Winthrop Headworks North Main Pump Station – Pumps still distracted Staff reset breakers in pump station Started Pumps/got pump come up short cautions Staff examined alerts on lube oil frameworks ID\'d twofold disappointment in UPS at "Power Main Control Panel" (FMCP) FMCP skirted physically to re-stimulate VFD\'s Pumps began (staged startup) at 10:15 Station completely operational by 12:15 NStar switch supplanted. B-Bus reestablished onto NStar at 20:00

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North Main Pump Station VFD Typical Permissives VFD – bearing/winding temp, over-burden, vibration, FMCP Pumps – Flow way, seal water, bearing temp, vibration, lube oil Pump Shaft – bearing temp, vibration, lube oil B-Bus A-Bus VFD Motor Control Center (MCC) VFD Bypass VFD Force Main Control Panel UPS VFD Batteries VFD = Variable Frequency Drive (controls rate of pumps through variable force input)

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Event 1: April 3, 2004 07:54 Overall Effect: Collection framework choices made to PREVENT: Flooding Loss of life/harm Property harm Infrastructure harm Remote Headworks separated Staff sent to screen levels in gathering framework Limited stockpiling in accumulation framework (because of downpour occasion) Cottage Farm CSO office re-enacted. ~22 Mgal to Charles River Other tempest sewer flood locales enacted All stream sent through DITP got full treatment

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Event 2: April 11, 2004 19:23 Event – NStar line-to-line issue at K-Street Substation NStar power occupied to DITP until after 22:15 pm 1 st occasion of this write in the historical backdrop of DITP Effect – loss of all frameworks on DITP for roughly 2 hours 50 minutes

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April 11 Power Outage NStar Building On Deer Island NStar (South Boston) K-Street Substation 115,000 Volts Main Breaker 13,800 Volts Main Breaker MSB A-Bus B-Bus CTG A CTG B STG Deer Island Power Distribution Thermal Power Plant Support Facilities North Pumping South Pumping Primary Treatment A & B Primary Treatment C & D Secondary A & B Secondary C Cryogenic Oxygen Facility Residuals Treatment

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April 11 Power Outage NStar Building On Deer Island NStar (South Boston) K-Street Substation 115,000 Volts Main Breaker 13,800 Volts Main Breaker MSB A-Bus B-Bus Correction Action - Start CTG DC power supply disappointment kept CTG from controlling up DITP matrix Swithgear breakers should have been shut physically (exceptionally perilous) Power reestablished to A-Bus ~22:00 first Pumps began 22:15 CTG A CTG B STG Deer Island Power Distribution Thermal Power Plant Support Facilities North Pumping South Pumping Primary Treatment A & B Primary Treatment C & D Secondary A & B Secondary C Cryogenic Oxygen Facility Residuals Treatment

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Event 2: April 11, 2004 19:23 On CTG power from 22:15 until Midnight – while changing force back to NStar CTG stumbled disconnected. Plant power/pumping reestablished (with staged startup) on NStar at 00:12 All frameworks reset/plant working typically starting 01:30

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Event 2: April 11, 2004 19:23 Overall Effect: All Headworks separated Staff conveyed to screen levels in gathering framework Wastewater redirected to avoid flooding/reinforcements (~3hrs) North streams - Cottage Farm CSO (4.7 Mgal) to Charles River South streams – NI Emergency outfalls opened – 17 Mgal crude sewage into Quincy Bay All stream sent through DITP got full treatment

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Station number Location Description Enterococcus/100ml E. coli/100 ml 4/13/04 4/13/04 4/12/04 4/12/04 10 <5 117 Mid Hingham Bay 90 40 20 <5 080 Quincy Yacht Club 210 110 5 <5 079 Outfall 103 150 105 5 <5 082 Outfall 101 95 35 45 081 Outfall 102 125 55 Water Quality Monitoring in Quincy and Hingham Bays after NI Emergency Discharge on April 11, 2004 Enterococcus limits (for swimming, marine water): geometric mean 35, single example most extreme of 104 E. coli limits (for swimming, freshwater): geometric mean of 126, single example greatest of 235

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Date Time Station Location Enterococcus/100 ml E. coli/100ml 04/12/04 11:53 005 Magazine Beach, upstream of Cottage Farm 70 110 04/12/04 11:46 006 BU Bridge, downstream of Cottage Farm 50 60 04/12/04 11:31 007 MIT boat storage 100 120 04/12/04 11:25 008 Harvard Bridge 20 40 04/12/04 11:16 009 Between Harvard and Longfellow 20 04/12/04 11:08 010 Downstream of Longfellow 10 50 04/12/04 10:56 011 Downstream of Science Museum 10 50 04/12/04 11:37 145 Stony Brook outlet 3700 2800 Water Quality Monitoring in Charles River after Cottage Farm Emergency Discharge on April 11, 2004 Enterococcus limits (for swimming, freshwater): geometric mean of 33, single specimen most extreme of 62 E. coli limits (for swimming, freshwater): geometric mean of 126, single example most extreme of 235

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Corrective Actions MWRA held two electrical designing counseling firms to review and survey the occurrences ($100K) Retained an electrical testing firm to test all battery reinforcement frameworks on DITP Staff played out an intensive examination of all frameworks required in the occasions, autonomous of the counseling firms Repairs made to real hardware that either fizzled amid the occasions or were harmed as an aftereffect of the disappointment ($387K) UPS at FMCP (auxiliary disappointment for April 3 rd occasion) DC Power framework in Thermal Power Plant (optional disappointment for April 11 occasion) Facility cleanup ($57K) NStar supplanted rooftop (underlying driver of April 3 rd occasion) on their building Changed support techniques for testing battery reinforcement frameworks on DITP (UPS units) to distinguish issues before they get to be issues

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Corrective Actions (proceeded with) MWRA has played out a subsequent dark begin test for the warm power plant frameworks (on August 10, 2004.) This test did exclude any of the treatment frameworks and the warm power plant was electrically separated from the treatment plant frameworks and NStar. The new DC control framework worked as planned. Staff played out a nitty gritty investigation of all potential Pump Station single-purpose of disappointment components that may happen. Keep on working on actualizing suggestions by the counseling firms. 18 out of 61 are completely executed (starting 8/13). Keep on working with DEP/EPA on all subsequent activities … more…

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