Security as a Software Metric .

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Safety as a Software Metric. Matthias Felleisen and Robert Corky Cartwright Rice University. Why Safety as a Metric? . Measuring Software: Syntax versus Semantics What is Programming Language Safety ? What Makes an Individual Program Safe ? How about Teaching Program Safety? .
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Wellbeing as a Software Metric Matthias Felleisen and Robert Corky Cartwright Rice University

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Why Safety as a Metric? Measuring Software: Syntax versus Semantics What is Programming Language Safety ? What Makes an Individual Program Safe ? What about Teaching Program Safety?

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Why Measure Software? right and effective programming viable programming extensible programming

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What do Metrics Measure? lines of code number of methodology, gotos, circles, modules, proclamations versus expressions, … in short: Syntactic Attributes of programming

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What ought to Metrics Measure? rightness extensibility practicality in short: semantic and hierarchical characteristics

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Measuring Correctness is Difficult … objective: measure certain parts of accuracy particularly: expect the programming dialect is protected, what sort of issues would we be able to foresee?

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Safe Programming Languages

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Safety - A High-Level View (1) "Close the valve by 10 degrees!" "Turned the valve by 10 degrees!"

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Safety - A High-Level View (2) "Close the valve by 10 degrees!" "Turned the valve by 15 degrees!"

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Safety - A High-Level View (3) "OUCH!" "Close the valve by 10 degrees!"

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Safety - A High-Level View (4) - - - -

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Safety - A High-Level View (5) - - - - ERROR!

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C and C++ are NOT Safe! int f(int n, int m) { int r = n % m; if (0 == r) return m; else return f(m,r); } primary() { roast a = \'a\'; burn b = \'b\'; int mn[2] = {24,6}; scorch c = \'c\'; singe d = \'d\'; printf("%d\n",f(mn[0],mn[1])); printf("%d\n",f(mn[0],c)); printf("%d\n",f(mn[0],mn[2])); }

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Safety in Programming Languages a sheltered dialect ensures each computational primitive, e.g., +, *, if, vector-query, record dereference, … assurance is actualized with a blend of accumulate time and run-time checks security ensures mistakes are gotten wellbeing incredibly expands viability of investigating

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Safety … is NOT simply TYPE checking!

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Examples Fortran C C++ Perl ML Eiffel Java Scheme (untyped, however sheltered) SAFE Languages UNSAFE Languages

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Safe Programs and Measuring Safety

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Measuring the Safety of Programs projects in safe dialects flag mistakes projects ought not flag blunders figure out if any computational primitive may flag a mistake make software engineers clarify potential shortcomings

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MrSpidey: Measuring the Safety of Scheme Programs Scheme is a vernacular of Algol and LISP lexical extension, five star capacities ("small questions") LISP\'s linguistic structure (enclosures) and primitives (cons, auto, and cdr)

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some capacity call, some place in the program

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SYMBOLS are terrible for +

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general information shapes

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Measuring Safety is More than Checking Types check general "information shapes" records with in any event N things vector references …

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list with no less than one NUMBER

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NIL is not alright

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An Elaborate Example from the Scheme Front-end S-expression S-expression ( let (<var> <rhs:exp>) <body:exp>) (( lambda (<var>) <body:exp>) <rhs:exp>)

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… yields numerous checks frail invariant

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more grounded invariant yields more grounded results

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Teaching with Safety Metrics

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Program Construction: Rice University, Fall 1998 course on program wellbeing understanding measuring in light of Scheme and Java

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On Safety of Languages and Programs programming dialect security program wellbeing hypothesis and devices for "measuring" program security rationales that conservatively surmised semantics rationales that amplify the rationale of sort checking

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The Pragmatics of MrSpidey utilizing MrSpidey: checking understanding potential blame destinations: information set information stream is it an issue with the program? is it an issue with the hypothesis/apparatus? in the event that the last mentioned, can a re-association offer assistance?

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Hands-on Work homework assignments sets of issues for every shot expanding multifaceted nature hypothesis and practice extend: actualize successive subset of Java modules and information invariants that cross limits investigating vast bits of code

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Evaluation (1) course assessment: incredible focused on inquiries: comprehension of dialect wellbeing comprehension of program security comprehension of measuring security with hypothesis provers adequacy of homeworks versus extend

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Evaluation (2) Positives: acknowledge wellbeing acknowledge apparatuses acknowledge hypothesis comprehend the above in view of homework Negatives extend too substantial

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Summary new, semantics-based pondering "measurements" augmentations: measuring more grounded invariants (numeric imperatives, polyvariant); measuring association (designs?) instructing: a great way to deal with have understudies comprehend fractional rightness

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Thank You Mike Fagan (92) Andrew Wright (94) Cormac Flanagan (96) Matthew Flatt Shriram Krishnamurthi Robby Findler

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