Jewels and struggle Address at HEI, 8 May 2007 Course E 586 Asset and Ecological Clash - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

diamonds and conflict lecture at hei 8 may 2007 course e 586 resource and environmental conflict l.
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Jewels and struggle Address at HEI, 8 May 2007 Course E 586 Asset and Ecological Clash PowerPoint Presentation
Jewels and struggle Address at HEI, 8 May 2007 Course E 586 Asset and Ecological Clash

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Jewels and struggle Address at HEI, 8 May 2007 Course E 586 Asset and Ecological Clash

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  1. Diamonds and conflictLecture at HEI, 8 May 2007Course E 586 Resource and Environmental Conflict Nils Petter Gleditsch Centre for the Study of Civil War (CSCW at International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) & Department of Sociology and Political Science, Norwegian University of Science and Technology

  2. Environmental factors in conflict: Five views • Neomalthusianism: Resource scarcity leads to conflict • Political ecology: It's the distribution of resources! • Cornucopianism: There is no inherent resource scarcity • Resource curse: Resource abundance is the problem • Institutionalism: Cooperation can overcome ABUNDANCE* * as well as scarcity, of course

  3. Problems with existing studies • with the indicators of natural resources • do all primary commodities have the same effect? • endogeneity • are we really measuring underdevelopment? • spurious relationship? • with the level of measurement • national vs. subnational • administrative subunits vs. pixels

  4. Priority resources Conlit: Mentioned in the conflict literature Other metals: Aluminium (Ghana), copper (Zambia), silver (D R Congo), tin (Bolivia), uranium (Niger) Source: Gilmore et al. (2005), Olsson (2006), and other sources

  5. Determinants of civil war • Diamonds can – • provide income for corrupt governments and a motivation to overthrow them • provide economic opportunity for rebel movements through looting and extortion • contribute to strengthening the identity of groups that stand to gain from secession or autonomy • Motivation • greed, grievance • Opportunity • geographical, economic • Identity • group formation

  6. Diamond data • Discovery • Production • Exports • Geological type • Location

  7. Types of diamonds

  8. Diamond production, 1990–99 Source: Olsson (2007: Table 1)

  9. Number of records 1,168 Number of countries 53 % of records with geographic coordinates 95.5 Number of countries with production 31 % of records coded as active mining activity 67.6 % of records coded as probable mining activity 5.48 Number of countries with no production 22 % of records coded as no mining activity 12.9 % of records coded as unknown mining status 14.0 Number of countries with primary deposits 31 % of records coded as primary diamond deposits 20.2 Number of countries with secondary deposits 40 % of records coded as secondary diamond deposits 74.6 Number of countries with marine deposits 3 % of records coded as marine diamond deposits 2.83 % of records coded as unknown geological form 2.40 % of all records with known discovery date 39.5 % of records with production and known production date 38.8 Overview of DIADATA Source: Gilmore et al. (2005)

  10. Effects of diamonds • Slow economic growth • Factional, predatory state • Looting, conflict Source: Olsson (2006, 2007)

  11. Diamond production and growth, 1990–99 Source: Olsson (2003, 2006, 2007)

  12. Diamond disturbances Civil war: Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, D R Congo Rent seeking, corruption, etc: Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Uganda, Republic of Congo Funding of terrorism: Hezbollah (through Lebanese traders in Africa) Source: Olsson (2006: 1140–1141

  13. Mechanisms linking natural resources to conflict Greedy rebels - domestic group engage in quasi-criminal activity - natural resources increase the value of the state - bid for secession (where resources are concentrated) Greedy outsiders - states - corporations Grievance - emerging inequalities - trade shocks - environmental damage, forced migration - greater inequality than other resources Source: Humphreys (2005: 511–513)

  14. … and more mechanisms Feasibility - funding rebellion through control of production - selling 'booty futures' Weak state - untaxed citizens have little influence over government - the state fails to create a strong bureaucracy Sparse networks - weak manufacturing sector and low internal trade and thus low understanding between cultures - and seven mechanisms linking natural resources to conflict duration Source: Humphreys (2005: 511–513)

  15. Empirical findings Diamond production per capita positively linked to onset of conflict 1960-99 Both for global sample and Africa sample In global sample, holds for politically unstable states, for politically strong states, but not for 'Weberian states' States with natural resources (including diamonds) have shorter conflicts States with natural resources (including diamonds) experience military victories More support for grievances and weak state structures than for booty futures and state capture – but cannot distinguish between all mechanisms Source: Humphreys (2005: 511–513)

  16. Diamond Production andOnset of Internal Armed Conflict, 1946–2001 From: Lujala et al. (2005), For the conflict data, see Gleditsch et al. (2002) and www.prio.no/cscw/armedconflict. The list of independent states follows Gleditsch & Ward (1999) and the diamonds data are from Gilmore et al. (2005).

  17. Civil war onset and diamonds– discovery and production, 1946–99 Bivariate results. Conflict data from Fearon & Laitin (2003), diamond data from Gilmore et al. (2005).

  18. Internal armed conflict and diamonds, 1989–99 Bivariate results. Conflict data from Gleditsch et al. (2002) and www.prio.no/cscw/armedconflict, diamonds data from Gilmore et al. (2005).

  19. Multivariate results Production of primary diamonds not associated with onset, but negatively associated with incidence of civil war 1945-99 Production of secondary diamonds not associated with either onset or incidence Interaction between secondary production and ethnic fractionalization positively associated with incidence of civil war Secondary production associated with onset of ethnic war, 1945-99 And particularly after the Cold War But diamond occurrence not associated with war Conflict data from Gleditsch et al. (2002) and www.prio.no/cscw/armedconflict, diamonds data from Gilmore et al. (2005).

  20. Diamonds and conflict I 1989–99. Diamond data from Gilmore et al. (2005), conflict data from Buhaug & Gates (2002) and Buhaug & Rød (2006).

  21. Diamonds and conflict II Source: Gilmore et al. (2005: 269)

  22. Diamonds and conflict in Africa, 1970–2001:A disaggregated analysis Areas with territorial conflict tend to be further away from secondary diamond locations Areas with government conflict tend to be closer to secondary diamond locations This also holds when using control variables But claims to try to topple the government may be phony – warlords are satisfied with the loot Source: Buhaug & Rød (2006).

  23. Why some are peaceful, others not • Botswana vs. Sierra Leone • Kimberlites vs. alluvial diamonds • Kimberlites usually in deserts or Arctic areas, alluvial deposits in rough terrain (jungle) • Good institution • But what determines the institutions? • The role of De Beers

  24. Conflict diamonds • 'Conflict diamonds are diamonds that originate from areas controlled by forces or factions opposed to legitimate and internationally recognized governments and are used to fund military action in opposition to those governments, or in contravention of the decisions of the Security Council.' Source: United Nations (2002)

  25. Countermeasures • UN Security Council 1998, two resolutions that prohibited direct or indirect imports of diamonds from Angola • UN Security Council 2000, ban on all imports of diamonds supplied by the RUF rebels in Sierra Leone • May 2000, Kimberley meeting • December 2000, UN General Assembly votes to create certification scheme • 2002, ban on all imports from Liberia, due to links to the RUF • 4 May 2007: Sanctions against Liberia lifted • Ghana: Diamond exchange under the control of the state • D R Congo 2003: assisting small-scale mining sector with a view to bringing it into the formal economy

  26. Kimberley Process States and organizations satisfying the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme as of May 2007 Angola Armenia Australia Bangladesh Belarus Botswana Brazil Canada Central African Republic China, People's Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic Cote D' Ivoire Croatia European Community Ghana Guinea Guyana India Indonesia Israel Japan Korea, Republic of Lao, Democratic Republic of Lebanon Lesotho Liberia Malaysia Mauritius Namibia New Zealand Norway Russia Sierra Leone Singapore South Africa Sri Lanka Switzerland Tanzania Thailand Togo Ukraine United Arab Emirates United States of America Venezuela Vietnam Zimbabwe + 'Chinese Taipei' 46 + 1 countries/organizations, accounting for 99,8% of the world's production of rough diamonds (www.kimberleyprocess.com)

  27. Effective? Conflict diamonds from Angola, D R Congo (Kinshasa), Liberia, and Sierra Leone have been smuggled to neighboring countries that are not under sanctions, like Central African Republic, Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) and re-exported from there 2005–06: Neither Angola (2004), D R Congo (2001), Liberia (2003), Sierra Leone (2000) listed with armed conflict Source: United Nations (2001b), cited from Olsson (2007). Conflict data from www.prio.no/cscw/armedconflict. Year in parentheses: Last year with armed conflict > 25 battle deaths, according to Uppsala/PRIO conflict database (www.prio.no/cscw/armedconflict)

  28. References • Buhaug & Gates, 2002 • Buhaug, Halvard & Päivi Lujala, 2005. 'Accounting for Scale: Measuring Geography in Quantitative Studies of Civil War', Political Geography 24(4): 399–418 • Buhaug, Halvard & Jan Ketil Rød, 2006. 'Local Determinants of African Civil Wars, 1970–2001', Political Geography 25(3): 315–335 • Fearon & Laitin, 2003 • Gilmore, Elisabeth, Nils Petter Gleditsch, Päivi Lujala & Jan Ketil Rød, 2005. 'Conflict Diamonds: A New Dataset', Conflict Management and Peace Science • 22(3): 257–292 • Gleditsch & Ward, 1999 • Gleditsch et al., 2002 • Humphreys, Macartan, 2005. 'Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution – Uncovering the Mechanisms', Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(4): 508–537 • Klare, Michael T. 2001. Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict. New York: Metropolitan • * Lujala, Päivi; Nils Petter Gleditsch & Elisabeth Gilmore, 2005. 'A Diamond Curse? Civil War and a Lootable Resource', Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(4): • 538–562 • Olsson, Ola, 2003. 'Conflict Diamonds', Working paper (86). Gothenburg: Department of Economics, University of Göteborg (earlier version of Olsson, 2007) • Olsson, Ola, 2006. 'Diamonds Are a Rebel's Best Friend', World Economy 29(8): 1133–1150 • Olsson, Ola, 2007. 'Conflict Diamonds', Journal of Development Economics 82(2): 267–286 • Ross, Michael, 2006. 'A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War', Annual Review of Political Science 9: 265–300 • United Nations, 2001a. Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo. S/2001/357. New York: United Nations • United Nations, 2001b. Addendum to the Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo. S/2001/1072. New York: United Nations • United Nations, 2002. 'Conflict Diamonds: Sanctions and War, www.un.org/peace/africa/diamond.html • For material on the Kimberley Process, see www.kimberleyprocess.com

  29. Next week: Tuesday 15 May Water and Conflict, with student presentations by Daniela Fabel, Michael Jakob, Jerome Lacourrege, and Samuel Spörri. Presentation on Angola (postponed from this week) by Andrea Buetler before the lecture).